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Abstract
The aim of this article is to examine the explanatory forces of power resources and institutional 
factors on whistle blowing activity, its effectiveness and reactions. The authors analyse survey 
material of 6000 Norwegian employees across sectors and industries, and find that individual 
power resources have little impact, but the organizational power resources of positions, and 
institutional factors matter. Departing from a Norwegian labour market model, this is a result 
that encourages continued focus on codetermination, democracy and openness.
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Introduction
Compared to international research, research on whistle blowing in Norway shows a 
high proportion of whistle blowing activity, a high amount of positive reactions towards 
whistle blowing and high effectiveness (Skivenes and Trygstad, 2010, 2012). Our 
hypothesis is that the Working Environment Act (WEA, 2005), which encompasses the 
bulk of Norwegian industrial life,1 as well as collective agreements and extensive coop-
eration between trade unions and employers’ organizations locally and nationally, have 
facilitated an institutional context for whistle blowing activity (cf. Skivenes and Trygstad, 
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2010). In this article we examine this hypothesis by contrasting the impact of individual 
power resources (education, seniority, hours at work, gender and the hierarchical posi-
tion of the employee) versus institutional arrangements (employee is organized, presence 
of employee representatives at the workplace, role as a trade union representative or 
safety representative, collective agreements and whistle blowing procedures). We use 
data from one of the most extensive studies on self-reported whistle blowing in Norway 
including 6000 respondents across different sectors.2 The main findings are in line with 
other Norwegian studies on whistle blowing in Norway (cf. Skivenes and Trygstad, 
2012: 106–107):
••   34% of the employees had observed serious wrongdoing at the workplace in the 
last 12 months;
••  53% of them blew the whistle on the wrongdoing;
••  49% of the whistle blowing resulted in improvement in the wrongdoing;
••  54% of the whistle blowers reported positive reactions, and 35% did not experience 
any reactions.
The question we examine is to what degree these results can be explained by individual 
power resources, or by institutional arrangements. The article starts with a presentation 
of the main concepts and research on whistle blowing, followed by an outline of 
the Nordic labour market model and the Norwegian approach to whistle blowing. Theory 
and methodological issues are presented thereafter, followed by findings and a 
discussion section. Finally, we end the article with a few concluding remarks.
Definitions and research on whistle blowing
Whistle blowing is usually defined as ‘the disclosure by organization members (former 
or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their 
employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action’ (Near and 
Miceli, 1985: 4; Miceli et al., 2008; Near et al., 2004). The definition by Near and Miceli, 
from the Human Resources tradition, includes both internal as well as external whistle 
blowing, e.g. to report wrongdoing to authorities or media outside the organization. Also 
when the focus is on ‘public interest’ whistle blowing, e.g. reports of wrongdoing that 
clearly affect organizational or social interests wider than the personal or private ones, as 
in our study, the definition is useful. Whistle blowing is important for both ethical and 
efficiency reasons. From a welfare point of view, reporting may be vital to preserve the 
health and safety of both the workforce and the general public (cf. Green, 2012: 125). 
Seen as an argument for increased efficiency, people who report wrongdoing can assist 
their employers by offering solutions to work problems. Thus, whistle blowing can be 
viewed as part of a strategy to maintain and improve the quality of production processes 
(Baillien et al., 2011; Daugareilh, 2008; Miceli et al., 2008). Finally, whistle blowing 
could be regarded as an important democratic human right, i.e. the principles of justice 
and freedom of expression require that those who become aware of wrongdoing should 
have the opportunity to speak out without risk of reprisals (Eggen, 2009; cf. Skivenes 
and Trygstad, 2012).
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Whistle blowing is, however, often perceived to be a hazardous form of action due 
to the dangers of retaliation when challenging a practice or powerful persons inside 
the organization (Miceli et al., 2008). In research on whistle blowing, the resource 
dependency theory of power (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978) is often used to explain the 
outcome of a whistle blowing process (Miceli et al., 2012). This theory has been criti-
cized for resting on the assumption that power is mobilized ‘in the face of conflict and 
opposition’ (Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998: 453). According to Lukes (2005), 
power is also exercised through hegemonic processes: legitimation of power through 
cultural and normative assumptions. Power can be used to ensure that conflicts never 
arise, at least not in ‘public’ – known inside or outside the organization; that wrongdo-
ing remains under-reported – or if reported, not dealt with in an appropriate way. We 
believe that different labour market models will have distinct institutional mecha-
nisms that may complicate or facilitate individual voice (Hagen and Trygstad, 2009; 
Trygstad and Bråten, 2011). These mechanisms can be considered resources for actors 
in certain positions. The idea of a just workplace, embedded in the Nordic labour 
market model, can be regarded as an institutionalized power base that gives trade 
union representatives and safety representatives access to resources by virtue of their 
roles (Engelstad, 1999; Hagen, 2010: 309). This may explain why some labour market 
models seem to facilitate whistle blowing, at the same time as some models may con-
tribute to a culture of silence.
The empirical findings in studies on whistle blowing are contradictory (see Mesmer-
Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli and Near, 2002, Miceli et al., 2008).3 This is 
partly due to challenges involved in gaining access to adequate data on whistle blowing 
activities, and the problems involved in measuring the relation between wrongdoing, 
whistle blowing and sanctions. There is also use of different definitions of whistle 
blowing and wrongdoing. Even in Norway, with a short history of research on whistle 
blowing, there are challenges when comparing existing research. We have in previous 
studies shown how whistle blowing in Norway distinguishes itself from international 
findings, and in particular findings from the US (Skivenes and Trygstad, 2010), and 
present here the major research contributions on Norwegian whistle blowing 
consisting of eight larger studies (cf. Skivenes and Trygstad, 2012). A majority of 
Norwegian employees report misconduct, and usually they report it to their immediate 
supervisor (58%) or a trade union representative or a safety representative (18%) first. 
The majority of the employees notified openly and verbally (69%), while 27% reported 
the misconduct openly and in writing. Only 4% reported the wrongdoing anonymously 
(Trygstad, 2010: 62). The findings from the eight Norwegian studies, reviewed in 
Skivenes and Trygstad (2012), show that between 38% and 83% of the employees 
blow the whistle. Norway stands out also in terms of reactions, as a smaller proportion 
– between 7% and 18% – of the whistle blowers experience sanctions. The most 
common form of retaliation was strong dissatisfaction and verbal harassment from 
leaders; stagnation of career or wage; or that one simply became degraded. There are 
also some who lose their jobs, or are exposed to hidden sanctions, e.g. excluded from 
social interactions. Further, between 50% and 71% reported that the misconduct had 
been fully resolved or improved.
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The Norwegian context
The Norwegian model of labour relations was shaped in the 1930s, although the first 
agreement – Verkstedsoverenskomsten – was reached in 1907 as the first modern collec-
tive agreement. The fundamental rights and duties that regulate company industrial 
relations are primarily found in the ‘basic agreements’. Each sector is covered by 
separate agreements, but the differences when it comes to codetermination and partici-
pation are few. The trade unions’ representatives, elected by the members, constitute the 
partner with whom management must negotiate at different levels in the company. 
However, the collective bargaining dimension is considered a key precondition for 
establishing balanced power relations and maintaining the ceiling of tripartite collabo-
ration. In the public sector all employees are covered by a collective agreement, while 
58% are covered in the private sector (average: 73%) (Nergaard, forthcoming). Hence, 
the density and the legitimacy among members are an important power resource (Hagen 
and Trygstad, 2009). In the public sector, 80% of the employees are members of a trade 
union, compare to 37% in the private sector (average: 52%).
According to the Norwegian Working Environment Act (WEA, 2005) all enterprises 
with 10 employees or more are obliged to have a safety representative at the workplace 
which shall be elected by and among the employees. Together, this gives trade unions, 
safety representatives and employees important roles as stakeholders in the organization. 
At a general level, there are well-established channels for representative and individual 
voices. In terms of whistle blowing, Norway is one of the few countries that display 
strong protection of whistle blowers, and Norwegian employees have the right to report 
wrongdoing externally under certain conditions (Lewis and Trygstad, 2009). In a histori-
cal perspective, it could be argued that statutory provisions have required employees to 
report wrongdoings in the organizations since 1956, when the provision of safety 
representatives was incorporated in the Norwegian Environment Act. The concept of 
‘whistle blowing’ is, however, new, and the Norwegian WEA from 2005 states that an 
employee has ‘a right to notify concerning censurable conditions at the undertaking’, and 
covers both internal and external whistle blowing. Section 2-4(2) of the WEA from 2005 
states that the employee must ‘follow an appropriate procedure in connection with such 
notification’ but, notwithstanding this, there is the right to notify in accordance with the 
duty to notify or the undertaking’s procedures for notification. Further, reporting 
wrongdoing to union representatives and/or the safety representative and to supervisory 
authorities, for example, the Labour Inspection Authority, is always regarded as 
appropriate.4 Section 2-4(3) of the WEA from 2005 places the burden on the employer to 
prove that notification was not made in accordance with this section. Section 2-5 (WEA, 
2005) prohibits retaliation against an employee who invokes or attempts to invoke 
Section 2-4. Irrespective of the fault of the employer, compensation is available if the 
court thinks it reasonable. The WEA strongly recommends that workplaces establish 
procedures for reporting misconduct. Section 3-6 (WEA, 2005) states that employers 
ought to ‘develop procedures for internal notification or implement other measures that 
facilitate notification concerning censurable conditions … if the circumstances in the 
undertaking so indicate’ (cf. Lewis and Trygstad, 2009). If the enterprise has an internal 
whistle blowing procedure (WEA, 2005: § 3-6), it is expected that a concern will be 
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processed in accordance with that procedure. The presence of such procedures can make 
the whistle blowing process less arbitrary and may neutralize individual power resources 
in the sense that also employees who lack individual power resources such as education 
and positions may blow the whistle when observing wrongdoing. However, the institu-
tionalized structures for participation and whistle blowing are not present throughout the 
Norwegian labour market. Some industries in the private service sector, characterized by 
few formal educational requirements, have low union density, they often do not fulfil the 
requirement of safety representatives at the workplace, and the possibility for individual 
and collective voice is poor compared to other parts of Norwegian working life (Berge 
et al., 2013; Bråten et al., 2013; Nergaard, 2014; Nergaard and Trygstad, 2013). Such 
differences may affect the willingness to report suspected wrongdoing, the reactions to it 
and the handling of the case.
Theoretical approach
We believe that different labour market models, with their institutions, industrial rela-
tions and work organizations, create different frameworks for whistle blowing (Skivenes 
and Trygstad, 2014). According to Appelbaum and Schmitt (2009) and Mahoney and 
Thelen (2010), different labour market models have different approaches to work design, 
human resource practices and collective representation. In a cross-national study of 
low-wage occupations in five industries5 in six countries (Denmark, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom and the United States), Appelbaum and Schmitt argue that 
institutions (and their deterioration) play a large role in explaining differences between 
countries, and they distinguish between market employment regimes and inclusive 
employment regimes.6 These two regimes or models differ in a systematic way in the 
extent of employees’ involvement in decision making, ranging from strongly institution-
alized participation in inclusive systems to the exclusion of labour from a significant role 
in decision making in market regimes (Gallie, 2007: 17–19). We argue elsewhere that 
these characteristics influence the definitions of wrongdoing inside the organization (cf. 
Skivenes and Trygstad, 2014) and the questions like: who has authority to define an act 
as wrongdoing or not, and what is considered private or public interests. Norway can be 
considered an inclusive employment regime or model, but the strength of the model 
differs among workplaces, sectors and branches.
Studies argue that powerful organizational members are more likely to report observed 
wrongdoing than others (Miceli et al., 2008). They may feel that they are obliged to act, 
that they can get someone to listen, and that they will escape negative consequences such 
as retaliation (Miceli et al., 2008: 44). In a Norwegian context, however, research shows 
that also employees who do not occupy such power resources choose to report wrongdoing 
(Skivenes and Trygstad, 2006). In comparison with international prevailing practices, 
Norwegian employees tend to be granted wider responsibilities, which will serve to 
strengthen the commitment to report wrongdoing (Skivenes and Trygstad, 2014). In line 
with Miceli et al. (2012), we think it may contribute to ‘organizational justice’, which 
promotes internal whistle blowing (Miceli et al., 2012: 928). Skivenes and Trygstad 
(2010) have promoted a hypothesis about how institutional arrangements which can be 
found in the unionized part of the Norwegian labour market contribute to certain 
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counterbalancing mechanisms that reduce the effect of individual power resources and 
make the opportunities for participation more egalitarian and democratic. For example, 
if the employees are covered by a collective agreement, trade union representatives will 
be present in the workplace and be consulted if problems occur. Hence, trade union 
representatives and safety representatives can be regarded as part of a social safety net 
that promotes engagement and voice, and vice versa (Hagen and Trygstad, 2009; 
Skivenes and Trygstad, 2012). In the following paragraphs, we present two explanatory 
approaches: individual power resources and institutional arrangements.
Individual power resources
Power resources can be material or immaterial, but they must be valued or seen as critical 
for other actors or groups in the system (Borum, 1995). The power resources possessed 
by different members of an organization determine (among other things) the individual’s 
freedom of action, their opportunities to make decisions, their influence on work opera-
tions and the leadership’s strategic choices.
Miceli et al. (2008) point out that empirical research has shown some tendency for 
whistle blowers to be more senior, and to have higher pay. Research has also suggested 
that employees with less at stake more frequently are inactive observers (Miceli et al., 
2012). Those with little seniority, and part-time employees, may have less to lose if 
retaliated against due to whistle blowing, but at the same time they may be less capable 
of getting powerful others to act due to lower credibility or perceived value to the organi-
zation, and may care less about whether the wrongdoing is corrected or not (Miceli et al., 
2008). We therefore include seniority as an indicator of individual power resources along 
with hours at work, since part-time employees may feel less committed to the organiza-
tion. Further, education was positively correlated with whistle blowing in one large 
study (Miethe, 1999). International studies indicate that whistle blowers tend to be key 
employees who are highly skilled and part of the enterprise’s core activities (Glazer and 
Glazer, 1989; Rothschild and Miethe, 1999). Two explanations are highlighted. First, 
these employees will be more concerned with the reputation of the enterprise than their 
co-workers who are on a lower rung in the enterprise hierarchy, and this has an impact 
on the choice to give notification or not. Second, highly skilled employees are more often 
found in strategic positions, where they have a better opportunity to discover any wrong-
doing. This indicates that whistle blowing may be correlated with level of education.
Although gender is a demographic variable it may also be treated as an indicator of 
power. In the literature, gender seems to have an impact on the whistle blowing process, 
but as pointed out by Miceli et al. (2012) – in an inconsistent way. Miethe (1999) found 
that men were more likely to blow the whistle, and Miceli and Near (1992) suggested 
that men would be more likely to report wrongdoing than women because men may 
occupy positions where more serious wrongdoing is more likely to be observed. Further, 
men may be more likely to be members of professions where whistle blowing is 
encouraged as part of a code of ethics, for example engineers or accountants. However, 
Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) have opposite findings: women who 
witnessed unaddressed wrongdoing were slightly but significantly more likely to blow 
the whistle than men. In their latest study, Miceli et al. (2012) find that women were 
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somewhat more likely to act on observed wrongdoing (Miceli et al., 2012: 949). Although 
gender equality has been highly emphasized both in politics and business in Norway for 
several decades, Norwegian working life is still rather gendered. Women are overrepre-
sented in industries like nursing, health and care, while men are overrepresented in 
engineering and manufacturing (Statistic Norway, 2009).7 In our study, there are signifi-
cantly more men that are leaders, and the differences increase the higher up we go. Thus, 
even though gender in our previous studies had no significant impact on the whistle 
blowing activity, we include gender in our analysis.
The authority and responsibility that follows a position may reflect the power of the 
whistle blower, but position has showed inconsistent relationships to whistle blowing. 
Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) found that job level was weakly related 
to both whistle blowing intent and actual whistle blowing. Further, a study of police 
officers and civilian employees in the state of Georgia found that supervisory status was 
a significant predictor of self-reported frequency of whistle blowing (Rothwell and 
Baldwing, 2007, in Miceli et al., 2008: 63). In this article we presume that the position 
as a middle manager contributes to report wrongdoing, and that it also may influence the 
way the concern is handled and the consequences of disclosing.
According to the WEA (2005), mangers, trade union representatives and safety 
representatives are given a special responsibility to contribute to a working environment 
free from harm and harassment, and the positions are given specific roles in a whistle 
blowing process (cf. Lewis and Trygstad, 2009). Thus, in our analysis we use seniority, 
hours at work, education, gender and the position as a middle manager as indicators of 
individual power resources and we test if they have an impact on whistle blowing 
activity and its consequences.
However, power resources can also be mobilized against the whistle blower, e.g. by 
the person responsible for the alleged wrongdoing. We believe that the power resources 
the person or persons responsible for the wrongdoing may have will have an effect on the 
choice of whether to blow the whistle or not. Further, Miethe (1999) finds that the risk of 
sanctions is strongly correlated with the threat posed by the whistle blower to the 
legitimacy of the organization. Skivenes and Trygstad (2010) find that the responsible 
person’s rank in the hierarchy has an impact on the choice to proceed with disclosure or 
not. An employee is more likely to report an issue if the person responsible is a 
colleague, rather than a manager. Thus the hierarchical position of the wrongdoer is 
important to include in the analysis.
Institutional arrangements
Our aim is to explore if institutional arrangements at the workplace matter in cases of 
wrongdoings, and if the mere presence of some structural arrangements at the workplace 
have an impact on whistle blowing activity and the consequences of disclosing miscon-
duct. Indeed, collective agreements, trade union representatives, a safety representative 
and whistle blowing guidelines can neutralize power resources. The institutional arrange-
ments provide both individual and collective rights to participate at the workplace. The 
organized part of Norwegian working life is characterized by a strong institutionalized 
framework, with laws and agreements that sustain a power balance between capital and 
labour, as well as workplace arrangements that maximize the opportunities for employees 
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to participate and exert influence (Dølvik, 2007; Hagen and Trygstad, 2009). Norwegian 
employees also consider their influence on their own work situation as high, and 
Norwegian workplaces seem to be characterized by a culture of communication and 
participation that managers also regard as both real and beneficial (Hagen and Trygstad, 
2009). At the same time, it cannot be taken for granted that the presence of trade union 
representatives or safety representatives will make a difference for those who act as 
whistle blowers. Thus, in our analysis we use seniority, hours at work, education, gender 
and the position as a middle manager as indicators of individual power resources and we 
test if they have an impact on whistle blowing activity and its consequences. In our analy-
sis, our indicators for institutional structures encompass: if the employee is organized, 
presence of employee representatives at the workplace, role as a trade union representa-
tive or safety representative, collective agreements and whistle blowing procedures.
Our analytical perspective is shown in Table 1.
Methodology
This article is based on a questionnaire survey among 6000 Norwegian employees and 
managers. We have excluded all top managers because top managers will usually have 
the authority to address any wrongdoing themselves. This gives us a sample of 5556 
respondents. The survey was implemented with the aid of Norstat’s web panel, which 
comprises approximately 81,000 persons, and is therefore not a purely random sample, 
such as those used by, for example, Statistic Norway’s labour force surveys (LFS). In 
February 2010 a random sample was drawn from the panel and used in the survey, and 
the response rate constituted 47%. Responses to the survey were biased in favour of 
employees with higher education, and thereby also in favour of public sector employees. 
It is reasonable to assume that this bias may affect the results, for example, the probabil-
ity to blow the whistle. We therefore chose to apply corrective weighting to the net 
sample, based on the true distribution of Norwegian employees with regard to the 
education and employment sectors, as reflected in the 2009 LFS for the first quarter. The 
LFS is regarded as a blueprint of the composition of the workforce. The weighted sample 
adequately reflects Norwegian industrial life in terms of gender, sector, level of educa-
tion and to some extent age, as the youngest age groups remain underrepresented. When 
compared to the data from the LFS, part-time employees and employees with loose ties 
Table 1. Analytical approach to whistle blowing activity and its consequences.
WB process Individual power resources
 Low High
Institutional features promoting voice Low Activity – +
 Effectiveness – –
 Retaliations + +
 High Activity + +
 Effectiveness + +
 Retaliations – –
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to the labour market remain underrepresented in the study. In general, this indicates that 
the study on whistle blowers reflects the more well-established parts of industrial life to 
a higher extent than the LFS, and that groups that combine paid work and studies or other 
activities are underrepresented.
Definitions
A precondition for becoming a whistle blower is that there is an opinion that a situation of 
wrongdoing has occurred at the workplace. However, opinions may sometimes differ as 
to whether a situation or an issue in fact is censurable, and in the survey respondents 
were asked:
‘During the last 12 months have you witnessed, discovered or experienced wrongdoing 
that should have been corrected at your workplace? By wrongdoing we mean unethical 
and/or illegal incidents, occurrences or practices.’ We then presented a list of 16 different 
types of wrongdoing that are regarded as violation of laws or professional guidelines 
regulating Norwegian working life. In order to conduct a deeper analysis of the material 
we divided these 16 alternatives into five groups that comprise the following types of 
issues:
•• Financial issues: embezzlement, bribes/corruption, unregistered work/tax evasion, 
theft of enterprise property/assets;
•• User-/customer-related issues: disrespectful behaviour towards users, unwilling-
ness to correct serious shortcomings of the service or product that could harm the 
user/customer, treatment of the user in contravention of prevailing regulations, 
infliction of violence on the user;
•• System failure issues: violations of health, safety and environmental regulations, use 
of illegal chemicals, emission of pollutants, use of intoxicants in the workplace;
•• Psycho-social working environment issues: bullying of colleagues or other 
employees, ethnic and sexual harassment of colleagues or other employees;
•• Other issues: this comprised a wide range of issues, such as issues related to working 
hours and lack of compensation for overtime, and issues pertaining to manage-
ment, including disrespectful behaviour by managers and incompetent managers.
We asked the respondents to base their responses on the most recent wrongdoing they 
disclosed. Employees who had observed wrongdoing and not reported any issues were 
asked to base their responses on the most recent wrongdoing they observed, when 
responding to why they chose not to report the issue.
Whistle blowing procedures
We examined whether the existence of formal whistle blowing procedures has an impact 
on whistle blowing activity, the outcome of the case concerned and the treatment of the 
whistle blower. A total of 36% of the respondents answered affirmatively, 5% stated that 
such procedures are being prepared, another 31% answered negatively, while 27% did 
not know. In our analysis we exclude those who have answered negatively and those who 
didn’t know.
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Dependent variables8
Whistle blowing. Respondents who had observed wrongdoing in the preceding 12 months 
were asked whether they reported the wrongdoing to anyone inside or outside the 
organization. Whistle blowing was coded as (0) if an employee experienced wrongdoing 
and did not report it, and it was coded as (1) if the employee reported it to anyone with 
power to effect action.
Effectiveness. We asked the employees whether their report of wrongdoing had led to 
changes in the wrongdoing. The response alternatives were: (1) the situation was resolved, 
(2) a clear improvement occurred, (3) a certain improvement occurred, (4) no significant 
changes occurred, (5) a certain deterioration occurred, (6) a clear deterioration occurred 
and (7) too little time had passed to allow for a conclusion. Those who answered the last 
alternative were excluded from the regression analysis.
Reaction. The respondents were asked if they had experienced some sort of reaction to 
their whistle blowing. The alternatives included (1) unambiguously positive feedback, (2) 
no reactions, (3) mixed reactions, which include both positive and negative feedback, and 
(4) unambiguously negative reactions. In the regression analysis we have excluded those 
who reported (2), and merged (3) and (4). In our logistic analysis, unambiguously positive 
feedback is coded (0), mixed and unambiguously negative feedback is coded (1).
Independent variables9
Individual power resources
Education is coded as: (1) elementary school, (2) upper secondary education, (3) 
college/university bachelor’s degree, and (4) college/university master’s degree or 
higher.
Seniority is a numerical variable measuring years in service.
Hours at work is coded: (0) full-time, (1) part-time.
Gender is coded: (0) woman, (1) man.
The position as a middle manager: middle manager is coded (1), others are coded (0).
Institutional arrangements
Organized: who are not, are coded (0), those who are, are coded (1).
Employee representative: the variable includes both those who are safety representa-
tives and trade union representatives. Those who are employee representatives, are 
coded (1), others are coded as (0).
Employee representatives at the workplace: This variable includes both trade union 
representatives and safety representatives at the workplace. The presence of employee 
representatives at the workplace is coded: (0) no, (1) yes.
Collective agreements are coded: (0) no, (1) yes.
Formal whistle blowing procedures are coded: (0) no, (1) yes.
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Control variables
Focal wrongdoing: the most recent wrongdoing observed and the most recent wrong-
doing reported are dichotomous variables: financial issues: (0) not observed/not 
reported, (1) observed/reported; user-/customer-related issues: (0) not observed/not 
reported, (1) observed/reported; system failure: (0) not observed/not reported, (1) 
observed/reported; psycho-social working environment issues: (0) not observed/not 
reported, (1) observed/reported; other: (0) not observed/not reported, (1) observed/
reported.
Responsible for the wrongdoing: the person perceived to be responsible for the 
misconduct is coded as: (1) subordinate, (2) colleague, (3) immediate supervisor, (4) 
other supervisor, (5) top management and (6) the board. There is also an ‘other’ 
category, which has been excluded from the regression analyses.
Number of employees in the enterprise is coded: (1) up to 5, (2) 5–9, (3) 10–19, (4) 
20–49, (5) 50–99, (6) 100–199, (7) 200 and more.
Sector: employees working in the private sector are coded (0), those who work in the 
public sector are coded (1).
Findings
What is observed, and who are responsible?
A total of 34% (n =1871) have observed serious wrongdoing, and the most frequently 
reported issue is ‘violations of health, safety and environmental regulations’ (17%), 
followed by ‘disrespectful behaviour towards users/customers’ (12%) and ‘bullying of 
colleagues/co-workers’ (11%). At the other end of the scale we find ‘infliction of vio-
lence on users’, ‘receipt of bribes/corruption’, ‘embezzlement’ and ‘emission of harmful 
pollutants’, each accounting for 1%. Two percent responded ‘other’.
Thirty-nine percent said that a colleague was responsible for the most recent wrong-
doing they had observed, followed by the immediate supervisor (32%), the top 
management (20%) and 16% responded ‘other supervisor’.
Whistle blowing activity
Among those who have discovered one or more acts of wrongdoing, a proportion of 53% 
(n = 987) state that they have reported the incident, primarily to someone inside the 
organization.10 Nine percent did also report the wrongdoing to an external recipient. For 
various reasons 37% (n = 718) have chosen to remain silent.11 The most reported reason 
for silence is fear of reprisals, and surprisingly we find that middle managers to a larger 
degree than others state that the reason for silence is that ‘the consequences would have 
been too unpleasant’ (Trygstad, 2010). Based on the most recent issue that was reported, 
we arrive at the following distribution of topical areas: financial issues: 6%; user-/ 
customer-related issues: 35%; system failure issues: 38%; psycho-social working 
environment issues: 15%; other: 6%.
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Employees follow regular reporting procedures when they disclose wrongdoing, or 
act in accordance with procedures described as appropriate in the WEA (2005). Almost 
seven out of 10 have notified their immediate supervisor of issues that they perceived as 
wrongdoing. Thereafter, safety representatives (24%) and trade union representatives 
(19%) have been notified, and 17% responded that they have used the enterprise’s 
internal whistle blowing procedures. Relatively many have also reported matters to a 
management level above the immediate supervisor (16%) or to the top management 
(14%). Only a few have involved agencies outside the enterprise, such as the Labour 
Inspection Authority (2%), other inspectorates (1%), the police (1%) or the media (0.5%).
What influences the choice of reporting or not?
An employee is obliged to be loyal to the enterprise’s legitimate interests, which of course 
excludes attempts to cover up crimes and violation of laws and regulations (Ot. prp. nr. 84, 
2005–2006). In our analysis we measure skills with the variable education, which we 
treat as an indicator of individual power resources. In Table 2 we investigate if individual 
power resources impact the probability to blow the whistle. In order to take into account 
that the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable (0/1), we use logistic regression. 
The interpretation of the effects is quite similar to linear regression. In the table, we have 
included the variables that correlate with the dependent variable.
Education has no significant effect in the analysis. We do however find that those who 
are middle managers are less prone to report wrongdoing than other employees. 
The other variables measuring individual power resources have no significant effect. The 
findings presented in Table 2 further indicate that institutional arrangements matter. If a 
person holds an elected office as a trade union or safety representative, the probability to 
blow the whistle is greater compared to those who do not. We also see that the presence 
Table 2. Logistic regression (forward: conditional): Probability to report (0 = did not report, 1 
= reported).
Report
 B
Middle manager (0 = no, 1 = yes) .417**
Employee representative (0 = no, 1 = yes) .832***
Collective agreement (0 = no, 1 = yes) .303**
Whistle blowing procedures (0 = no, 1 = yes) .390***
System failure (0 = no, 1 = yes) .268**
Numbers of employees .083**
Constant .2
N 1059
Log likelihood 1333,465
Nagelkerke R2 .15
Cox and Snell R2 .11
**p < .05; ***p < .01.
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of whistle blowing procedures increases the chance for reporting misconduct. The same 
goes for those covered by a collective agreement. This may indicate that collective 
agreements to some extent are perceived as providing protection. We also see that if the 
most recent wrongdoing a person witnessed, discovered or experienced involved system 
failure, the chance for reporting is higher, compared to other types of wrongdoing. This 
category includes, for example, violations of health, safety and environmental regula-
tions and the use of illegal chemicals. Last, but not least, we see that an increased amount 
of employees in the enterprise may contribute to blowing the whistle. Indicators of 
individual power resources such as seniority, hours at work, education and gender are not 
included in the analyses due to lack of significant impact. The same is valid for the sector 
variable.
The effectiveness of whistle blowing
In our survey, half of the respondents (49%) state that the matter was resolved or that 
improvements occurred as a direct consequence of their whistle blowing activity; 31% 
answer that no significant changes occurred, while 3% (33 persons) report that a certain 
deterioration (2%) or a clear deterioration occurred (1%). An additional share of 16% 
reported the matter very recently, and it is too early to tell. To what extent will individual 
power resources and institutional arrangements at the workplace have an impact on the 
effectiveness of whistle blowing? Table 3 gives us an indication.
The findings displayed in Table 3 indicate that the institutional arrangement at the 
workplace has an impact. The role as an employee representative seems to make whistle 
blowing more effective. However, the significance level here is at 5%. Further, 
employees who have access to whistle blowing procedures tend to respond that the 
reporting was effective, i.e. the issue or matter was changed for the better or was resolved. 
Resources in the form of employee representatives who are present at the workplace also 
seem to matter. Employees who have no trade union representatives or safety representa-
tives available tend to achieve less change than other employees.
Table 3. Linear regression (stepwise): Effectiveness of whistleblowing (1 = the matter was 
resolved, 6 = a clear deterioration occurred).
Model B value T value
Constant 2.2 8.499***
Education .163 2.95***
Employee representative (0 = yes, 1 = no) .205 2.197**
Whistle blowing procedures (0 = no, 1 = yes) –.309 –5.865***
Employee representative at the workplace (0 = no, 1 = yes) –.117 –3.066***
Number of employees in the enterprise .067 2.279**
Person responsible for the misconduct (1 = subordinate,  
6 = board member)
.231 6.385***
Reporting of user-/customer-related issues (0 = no, 1 = yes) .403 4.233***
N = 987. Adjusted R2 = .241, F value = 22.9. **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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Our variables measure individual power resources, and only education has an impact, 
but in a surprising way. The higher the level of education of the whistle blower, the less 
effect he or she is likely to achieve, ceteris paribus. The other variables seniority, hours 
at work and gender – variables also grouped as individual power resources – have no 
significant effect and are excluded from the analysis.
Three of our control variables have significant impact upon effectiveness. We see that 
the rank of the person responsible matters: the higher the rank of the wrongdoer, the less 
effective a report of misconduct is likely to be. We also see that reporting of user- or 
customer-related issues significantly decreases the effectiveness, when compared to 
those who report issues pertaining to finance, system failure or the psycho-social 
working environment. Lastly, our model shows that number of employees has a similar 
significance level. The larger the enterprise is in terms of its number of employees, the 
lower the effectiveness of whistle blowing tends to be. The other control variable – sector 
– has no significant impact in the model: employees in the public sector are just as 
successful as their colleagues in the private sector when it comes to the effectiveness of 
whistle blowing.
Are whistle blowers sanctioned?
Our study shows that the most commonly experienced reactions include positive feedback 
from colleagues (47%), positive feedback from the management (36%) and no reaction at 
all (33%). From the questionnaires we can see that some respondents have ticked both 
positive and negative reactions. These include, for example, employees who respond that 
they have been reprimanded and rebuked by their supervisor, while at the same time 
receiving positive feedback from colleagues, and vice versa. We find that 13% encoun-
tered mixed and unambiguously negative reactions. What factors appear to have an effect 
on the reactions that are brought to bear on the whistle blowers? From Table 4 we can see 
that characteristics of the employees and features of the enterprise will have an impact.
Our findings suggest that women are more likely to be met with retaliation than men. 
We have no good explanation, but as mentioned earlier, the labour market in Norway is 
gendered. It could be that men who blow the whistle are more accepted among managers 
and co-workers than women. However, the other indicators grouped as individual power 
resources have no impact on reactions. On one hand, this comes as a surprise. On the 
other hand, it strengthens our hypothesis that institutional arrangements also matter 
when it comes to reactions. Whistle blowers who have access to appropriate procedures 
at their workplace are more likely to encounter positive reactions than others. We also 
see that the presence of employee representatives at the workplace tends to have a 
positive effect on the reactions, as those who have no access to such resources are at a 
greater risk of facing sanctions.
Once again we see that the hierarchical rank of the person responsible for the 
misconduct matters. If the person responsible is a board member or top manager, a 
whistle blower is more likely to face sanctions than in a situation where a subordinate 
person or a co-worker is responsible. Table 4 also indicates that it is more risky to report 
psycho-social working environment issues than other types of wrongdoing. Lastly, we 
see that employees working in the private sector have a higher likelihood of receiving 
retaliation than employees in the public sector.
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Would the whistle blowers act in the same manner again? A total of 82% respond in 
the affirmative, 4% in the negative, while 13% are uncertain. If we take a closer look at 
only those who responded yes or no, a correlation analysis shows a clear correlation with 
the reactions that the respondents have faced. Those who encountered negative reactions 
are far less likely to act as whistle blowers again (Pearson’s correlation coefficient .36**). 
In other words, negative reactions induce employees who have witnessed, discovered or 
experienced wrongdoing that ought to have been corrected to remain silent.
Discussion
The findings show that institutional arrangements seem to matter when it comes to the 
whistle blowing activity, its effectiveness and reactions, and to a lesser degree do indi-
vidual power resources have impact. The same goes for three of our control variables.
Individual power resources have no significant impact on the choice to become a 
whistle blower or not. In fact only the role as manager has an impact: middle managers 
seem to have a tendency to avoid reporting misconduct. One explanation could be that 
they have sufficient authority to resolve the matter themselves without reporting. It is 
also possible that managers submit information about the censurable issue through 
informal channels and resolve the case in this manner. Another explanation could be that 
managers are more reluctant to divulge such information, particularly if the culprit is a 
co-manager or a superior. As middle managers, they may be in a position to uncover 
wrongdoing that may harm the organization’s reputation. This may affect the ability to 
report, because the reactions could be unpleasant. As mentioned, managers more 
frequently than others explain their silence by pointing to exactly this fact: the 
consequences could be harsh. This indicates that even fear could be one of several 
reasons for silence.
Table 4. Logistic regression (forward: conditional): Factors that influence reactions  
(0 = unambiguously positive, 1 = mixed or unambiguously negative).
Reactions
 B
Gender (female = 0, male = 1) –.655**
Whistle blowing procedures (0 = no, 1 = yes) –.563 ***
Employee representatives at the workplace (0 = no, 1 = yes) –.235**
Person responsible for the misconduct (1 = subordinated, 6 = board) .470***
Reporting of psycho-social working environment issues 1.257***
Sector (private = 0, public = 1) –.724**
Constant –1.395***
N 468
Log likelihood 344.598
Nagelkerke R2 .286
Cox and Snell R2 .181
**p < .05; ***p < .01.
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When it comes to institutional arrangements the role as an employee representative 
increases the propensity to report wrongdoing. It seems like employee representatives 
act in accordance with the expectations embedded in the role. Trade union representa-
tives are charged with protecting the interests of the employees. To the extent that any 
censurable issues that harm their members occur, they are obligated to act. Safety 
representatives are in the same situation: if the working environment is harmful, it is the 
safety representative’s duty to report it to someone with the power to act. In addition, the 
role as employee representative provides a higher degree of protection, even if previous 
research has shown that safety representatives are not immune to negative sanctions 
following a disclosure of censurable conditions (Skivenes and Trygstad, 2006). Further, 
those covered by a collective agreement are more likely to report misconduct, and the 
availability of whistle blowing procedures exerts a clear effect in the direction of more 
reporting of wrongdoing. This is an encouraging result in the sense that it shows how 
whistle blowing procedures serve a real function in the workplaces where they exist. 
Finally, we find that employees in big organizations are more likely to blow the whistle. 
A reason could be that big enterprises are more formally structured and therefore may 
encourage employees to report misconduct compared to small ones (Falkum et al., 2009). 
Another reason is that according to the WEA of 2005, enterprises that have 10 or more 
employees are obliged to have a safety representative at the workplace and if the number 
of employees is 50 or more, the enterprise has to have a working environment committee 
where safety representatives meet the management. Hence, the number of employees is 
here related to institutional arrangements.
Individual power resources do not show any particular impact on whistle blowing 
efficiency, with one exception: high levels of education decrease the effectiveness of 
whistle blowing. Other studies have found that whistle blowers often are high skilled 
employees (Glazer and Glazer, 1989; Rothschild and Miethe, 1999). We expected highly 
educated employees to have a better opportunity to exert influence on decision makers or 
others who have authority to deal with the matter. Our findings do not support such an 
assumption, and we have made similar findings in previous studies (Skivenes and 
Trygstad, 2010). One explanation could be that holding a more elevated strategic 
position increases the chance that the wrongdoing also represents a larger threat to the 
legitimacy of the organization (cf. Miethe, 1999). Not reacting to reports of such issues 
could thereby constitute a strategy used by those who feel threatened, as ignoring a 
whistle blower could serve to prevent elucidation and less attention being drawn to the 
matter, in a short term perspective.
Also when it comes to effectiveness, our analysis confirms that institutionalized 
arrangements make a difference. Employees who hold elected office in the enterprise are 
more capable of effecting change than others. There could be a number of reasons. As a 
rule, trade union representatives and safety representatives will have a stronger voice in 
the organization, as holding an elected office implies that they represent not only 
themselves, and because they also have access to a number of channels where they can 
voice their concerns more effectively than other employees. Also, and not least, a large 
part of their role embodies the function of watchdog, whose duty it is to draw attention 
to misconduct. Employees working in enterprises where employee representatives are 
present, as well as in enterprises that have established whistle blowing procedures, tend 
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to achieve a higher degree of change in the censurable situation than those working in 
enterprises without such arrangements.
Our analysis also shows that those who reported wrongdoings related to user- or 
customer-related issues were less likely to observe that the situation had changed for the 
better. Our data indicate that whistle blowing activities are especially prevalent in health 
enterprises and the care/nursing services and social services sectors. In the latter two 
sectors we have indications that there is often a major discrepancy between the needs of 
the recipients of care and nursing, on the one hand, and the resources available to provide 
care, on the other. Disagreement will therefore occasionally occur over what is to be 
considered an adequate level of provision of care, and this could be one possible 
explanation of the lower effectiveness of whistle blowing (cf. Skivenes and Trygstad, 
2006). The higher the position of the person responsible, the less effective whistle 
blowing is likely to be. And finally, we find that the size of the organization matters; the 
larger the enterprise is in terms of its number of employees, the less effective whistle 
blowing seems to be. We lack good explanations for this, although it could possibly be 
due to a risk of whistle blowing reports more easily being overlooked in large organiza-
tions and less frequently being addressed, for example because of unclear areas of 
responsibility and/or high performance pressure in the enterprise. A further explanation 
could be that the whistle blower will have more difficulty observing any effects from his 
or her actions in a large enterprise than in a smaller one, where matters are more transpar-
ent. It is also plausible that changes in big organizations will take a longer time, 
compared to small ones. Clearly, these findings need to be examined further.
Whistle blowers most frequently face reactions in the form of positive feedback from 
colleagues and managers. A clearly negative finding, although not a very surprising one, 
is that the position that the person responsible for the misconduct has in the organiza-
tional hierarchy seems to increase the likelihood of retaliation. If the person responsible 
is a top manager, the risk of negative sanctions increases, compared to conditions for 
which the person responsible is a colleague. The power held by the person responsible 
indicates that caution is called for by those who witness, discover or experience miscon-
duct committed by a superior. The probability of receiving retaliation increases if the 
whistle blower is a woman. Again, we lack good explanations, but it may be related to a 
lower acceptance of women raising their voice in the organization. As regards indicators 
of institutional features that make a difference, the presence of whistle blowing proce-
dures and employee representatives at the workplace appears to have an impact with 
regard to sanctions as well. Findings clearly indicate that whistle blowing procedures 
increase the chance of the reporting being met with positive reactions. This indicates that 
whistle blowing procedures in fact render such reporting less risky and increase the 
opportunities for success. The same goes for the presence of employee representatives, 
which decreases the risk of negative sanctions.
When it comes to type of wrongdoing, we find that the risk for retaliation increases if 
the reported wrongdoing is a psycho-social working environment issue. This is in line 
with findings in previous studies (Einarsen and Pedersen, 2007; Skivenes and Trygstad, 
2010). It is also reasonable to assume that characteristics of the workplace can explain 
why reporting on psycho-social working environment issues invokes the toughest 
sanctions. In cases where bullying and sexual/ethnic harassment occur, the workplace is 
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likely to be characterized by absent leadership. Finally, it is more risky to be a whistle 
blower in the private sector. One reason may be that freedom of speech has a stronger 
position in general in the public sector. From empirical studies, we also know that trade 
union representatives and safety representatives are well represented at different levels 
and in different units in a public enterprise, and that both employees and employee 
representatives will have access to more forums compared to in the private sector.
Conclusion
This study has presented findings from one of the largest surveys conducted among the 
Norwegian labour force, showing that whistle blowing activity, effectiveness and 
reactions are in line with previous results in Norwegian whistle blowing research. 
Comparatively, Norwegian employees are high on whistle blowing activity and 
effectiveness, and low on retaliation. The explanatory analysis shows that individual 
power resources, when isolated, only have limited significant impact, while the powers 
from institutional arrangements are of importance. The findings confirm our hypotheses 
and support the underlying ideas of institutional arrangements and the impact the 
Norwegian labour model, with its democratic work ethic, has on whistle blowing. On the 
basis of our findings and analysis we believe that institutional arrangements contribute to 
a form of organizational justice; these forms of arrangements give employees opportuni-
ties to use their voice in terms of blowing the whistle. The safety net embedded in the 
institutional arrangements seems to reduce the risk of sanctions. This study shows that 
there is good reason for making clear to managers at various levels that retaliating against 
a whistle blower is illegal, and to underline the responsibility managers have in handling 
wrongdoings. The presence of whistle blowing procedures and employee representatives 
at the workplace increases the effectiveness of whistle blowing, enhances the likelihood 
that the wrongdoing will be addressed, and increases the probability that reactions will 
be positive. What we do not know is if whistle blowing procedures are decisive, or if 
procedures are only established by enterprises where favourable conditions already exist. 
The answer is likely to be both. Our findings, however, indicate that whistle blowing 
procedures do have an effect. A higher number of whistle blowers come forward, they 
more often succeed, and the likelihood of positive feedback is higher. It is also reasona-
ble to assume that the whistle blowing procedures would have been less prevalent if 
Section 3-6 – stating that whistle blowing procedures ought to be established – had not 
been included in the WEA of 2005. This demonstrates how institutional arrangements 
enacted at the central level may exert a direct influence at the workplace level. Although 
caution has been voiced on a possible over-emphasis on integrity and accountability 
regulations (Segal, 2012: 826), we regard whistle blowing procedures to be an important 
contribution that will strengthen the Norwegian labour market model’s focus on codeter-
mination, democracy and openness.
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Notes
 1. According to Sections 1-2 and 1-5 of WEA 2005: military aviation, shipping, hunting and 
fishing are specifically exempt and regulations may be issued concerning the extent to which 
the legislation applies to other forms of aviation, homeworkers, civil servants and parts of the 
public administration ‘when the activity is of such a special nature that it is difficult to adapt 
it to the provisions of the Act’.
 2. We do not find significant differences between sectors. Sector is highly correlated with 
collective agreement and is excluded from the regression analysis. In the analyses we have 
excluded senior managers and executives, since these groups will usually have the power to 
solve the wrongdoing by themselves. See Appendix 3 for information about the respondents’ 
sector and industries.
 3. This was pointed out by Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) in a meta-analysis of 
research on whistle blowing.
 4. Proposition No. 84 to the Odelsting (2005–2006), p. 40.
 5. Nursing assistants and cleaners in hospitals, cashiers and stock/sales clerks in food and 
electronics retail trade, process operatives in meat processing and confectionary, housekeep-
ers in hotels and incoming sales/service operators in call centres.
 6. Although the authors use the concept ‘regimes’ we prefer to use ‘models’ in our discussion.
 7. At: www.ssb.no/arbeid-og-lonn/artikler-og-publikasjoner/lonnsgapet-mellom-kvinner-og- 
menn-bestaar.
 8. Bivariate frequencies analyses of the dependent variables are presented in Appendix 1.
 9. A correlation analysis, including all the independent variables, is presented in Appendix 2.
10. Nine persons did report the wrongdoing initially outside the organization.
11. Those who answered that others had reported censurable issues (19%), or who intend to 
disclose an issue (3%), are removed from the group of ‘non-whistle blowers’ in the following 
analyses, since they cannot be perceived as a silent group.
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Effectiveness
 Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative 
percent
Valid The situation was resolved 92 1.6 11.1 11.1
 A clear improvement 166 2.8 20.0 31.1
 A certain improvement 229 3.9 27.6 58.7
 No significant changes 309 5.3 37.3 96.1
 A certain deterioration 20 .3 2.4 98.5
 A clear deterioration 13 .2 1.5 100.0
 Total 828 14.1 100.0  
Missing To little time has passed to 
allow for conclusion
158 2.7  
 System 4871 83.2  
 Total 5030 85.9  
Total 5858 100.0  
Reactions
 Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative 
percent
Valid Positive 542 9.3 80.5 80.5
 Mixed and negative reactions 131 2.2 19.5 100.0
 Total 673 11.5 100.0  
Missing No reactions 312 5.3  
 System 4873 83.2  
 Total 5185 88.5  
Total 5858 100.0  
Appendix 1. Bivariate frequencies analyses of the dependent variables.
Did you report the observed wrongdoing?
 Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative percent
Valid No 700 11.9 41.5 41.5
 Yes 987 16.8 58.5 100.0
 Total 1686 28.8 100.0  
Missing 99 185 3.2  
 System 3987 68.1  
 Total 4172 71.2  
Total 5858 100.0  
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Table A3-1. Respondents, sector and hierarchical placement. N = 5759.
Public sector Private sector Total
Top management 1 2 2
HR manager 1 2 3
Professional leader with some HR responsibilities 2 5 8
Professional leader 2 5 7
Employees 34 46 80
Total 40 60 100
Appendix 3.
Table A3-2. Respondents in private sector.
Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative 
percent
Valid Land based manufacturing 388 6.6 11.4 11.4
 Offshore related manufacturing 250 4.3 7.3 18.7
 Building and construction 334 5.7 9.8 28.5
 Retail 573 9.8 16.8 45.3
 Hotels and restaurants 103 1.8 3.0 48.3
 Communication, transport and 
dispatch
227 3.9 6.6 55.0
 Bank and insurance 179 3.1 5.3 60.2
 Media and publishing 115 2.0 3.4 63.6
 ICT, consultant, research, etc. 356 6.1 10.4 74.1
 Security guard, cleaning and 
other form of private service
68 1.2 2.0 76.1
 Kindergarten, private health 
and social services
182 3.1 5.3 81.4
 Culture, NGOs, sports 54 .9 1.6 83.0
 Primary industry 32 .6 .9 83.9
 Private schools / education 38 .6 1.1 85.0
 Other 511 8.7 15.0 100.0
 Total 3409 58.2 100.0  
Missing System 2449 41.8  
Total 5858 100.0  
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Table A3-3. Respondents in public owned companies.
Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative 
percent
Valid Bus, railway, 
post
149 2.5 45.7 45.7
 Energy 40 .7 12.4 58.1
 Roads and 
garbage 
disposal
9 .2 2.7 60.8
 Culture, 
research and 
education
26 .4 8.0 68.9
 Other 102 1.7 31.1 100.0
 Total 326 5.6 100.0  
Missing System 5532 94.4  
Total 5858 100.0  
Table A3-4. Respondents in public sector.
Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumulative 
percent
Valid Public 
administration
307 5.2 14.5 14.5
 The Norwegian 
armed forces, 
customs, police 
and probation
135 2.3 6.4 20.8
 Local and 
county 
government 
administration
284 4.9 13.4 34.2
 Hospitals 289 4.9 13.6 47.8
 Healthcare and 
social services
255 4.4 12.0 59.9
 Kindergarten, 
compulsory 
school and high 
school
490 8.4 23.1 83.0
 Colleges and 
universities
116 2.0 5.5 88.5
 Church,  
culture and 
research
69 1.2 3.3 91.7
 Other 176 3.0 8.3 100.0
 Total 2123 36.2 100.0  
Missing System 3736 63.8  
Total 5858 100.0  
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